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presumed that the court will be guilty of such an injustice. But
since this presumption must be made somewhere, why should it
not be made in favor of that branch of the government on which
the duty to be performed is primarily imposed as readily as in
favor of its co-ordinate? Such a presumption, however inapplicable to an inferior officer, does not seem inappropriate to a
magistrate who is clothed by the Constitution with the supreme
trust of taking "care that the laws be faithfully executed," and
who is privileged, in the execution of his office, to consult the
judges of this court as his legal advisers.
We think, therefore, that the court has no jurisdiction to issue
its writ of mandamus to compel the defendant to perform the duty
which in this case he is alleged to have disregarded.
Of course, in coming to this conclusion, we* unequivocally
admit that the governor of the state is amenable to the court like
any other person for his private acts, or for any act not properly
within the scope of his office, though done under the color of his
***
*
*
*
*
office. 1
The application is dismissed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.3
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Regulation of ommerce.-The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all
the navigable waters of the United States which are accessible from a
state other than those in which they lie; and includes, necessarily, the
power to keep them open and free from any obstruction to their navigation, interposed by the states or otherwise. And it is for Congress to
determine when its full power shall be brought into activity, and as to
I The rest of the opinion relates merely to the point that the action of the governor, in delaying the convening of a court-martial for twenty-one days, is not
such a refusal to do so as would make a case for the issue of a peremptory ,aanda.
mus, even if the court had jurisdictio.-ED. Ar. LAW REG.
VFrom vol. 3 of Wallace's Reports.
a From W. G. Veazey, Esq., State Reporter; to appear in 38 Vt. Rep.
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the regulations and sanctions which shall be provided: Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall.
This power, however, covering as it does a wide field, and embracing
a great variety of subjects, some of the subjects will call for uniform
rules and national legislation; while others can be best regulated by
rules and provisions suggested by the varying circumstances of different
places, and limited in their operation to such places respectively. And
to the .extent required by these last cases, the power to regulate commerce may be exercised by the states: .d.
To explain. Bridges, turnpikes, streets, and railroads, are means of
commercial transportation as well as navigable waters, and the commerce
which passes over a bridge may be much greater than that which will
ever be transported on the water which it obstructs. Accordingly, in
a question whether a bridge may be erected over one of its own tidal
and navigable streams, it is for the municipal power to weigh and balance against each other the considerations which belong to the subject
-the obstruction of navigation on the one hand, and the advantage to
commerce on the other-and to decide which shall be preferred, and
how far one shall be made subservient to the other. And if such erection be authorized in good faith, not covertly and for an unconstitutional
purpose, the Federal courts are not bound to enjoin it: .MT.
However, Congress may interpose whenever it shall be deemed necessary, by either general or special laws. It may regulate all bridges
over navigable waters, remove offending bridges, and punish those who
shall thereafter erect them. Within the sphere of their authority, both
the legislative and judicial power of the nation are supreme: .d.
Annunciating these principles on the one hand and on the other,
the court refused to enjoin, at the instance of a riparian owner, to
whom the injury would be consequential only, a bridge about to
be built, under the authority of the state of Pennsylvania, by the
city of Philadelphia, over the river Schuylkill, a small river-tidal
and navigable, however, and on which a great commerce in coal was
carried on by barges-which river was wholly within the state of
Pennsylvania, and ran through the corporate limits of the city
authorized to erect the bridge; and on both sides of which citizens in
great numbers lived, and on both sides of which municipal authority
was exercised, on one as much as on the other; the bridge being a
matter of great public convenience every way, and another bridge, just
like it, having been erected and in use for many years, over the same
stream, about five hundred yards above: Id.
EXECUTION.
Interest- Contract.-Where attached property becomes by process of
law changed into money in the officer's hands, and is invested by him
so as to produce interest, such interest belongs to the party entitled to
the money, and not to the officer: Richmond v. Collamer, 38 Vt.
The plaintiff, an officer, attached certain property belonging to S. and
sold it, in pursuance of the statute, at auction. The defendant bid off
the same and gave his note therefor, payable to the plaintiff on demand
with interest, and the property passed into the hands of S., the defendant acting in behalf of S. as his friend and agent. Subsequently the
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suit was settled, and the plaintiff, being directed by the creditor to surrender to S. all the property and securities in his hands derived from
the attachment, gave up said note, upon receiving a written promise
from the defendant to pay the accrued interest thereon, the defendant
supposing the plaintiff was legally entitled to the same, and the plaintiff claiming it on this ground. Held, that the plaintiff had no legal
right to collect the interest on the note, and that there was no considera.tion growing out of the surrender of the note and the defeudant's
promise to pay the interest, which will support the promise: Id.
FRAUDS,

STATUTE OF.

Contractfor Growing Timber.-The defendant agreed by parol to cut
into logs all the trees standing on a certain-described piece of land
belonging to the defendant, and to draw and deliver said logs, together
with others already cut on said land, at the plaintiff's mill, within a
certain time, the plaintiff to pay a specified price per cord when all
were delivered and measured at the mill. Held, that the contract was
within the Statute of Frauds, and could not be enforced by action:
Ellison et al. v. Brigham, 38 Vt.
INCEST.

Pleading.-Inan indictment for the crime of incest each count should
charge but one offence and specify the particular day when committed,
in accordance with the general rule of criminal pleading: S ate v.
Temple, 38 Irt.
Where one count alleged that the respondent committed this offence
"on the 20th day of September, A. D. 1860, and on divers other days
and times between said 20th day of September and the 9th day of December, A. D. 1862," it was held bad, upon motion in arrest of judgment, in that it alleged a series of offences, and that too-without
specifying any particular day when each was committed except the first.
The continuendo could not be rejected as surplusage, as the substance
of it was not wholly immaterial to the guilt or innocence of the accused: Id.
NEGLIGENCE.

Injury on Highways.-The plaintiff was travelling in company with
three other persons, and had occasion to leave the wagon for a few
minutes, and, while out, heard a team coming down the hill towards
him, and, being blind and ignorant of the character of the road, and
thq night so dark nobody could see him, left the travelled part of the
road to secure. his personal safety, and in so doing stepped over a bank
wall and received the injury complained of. Held, that he was justified
by necessity in leaving the travelled path, and if in so doing he acted
with reasonable care and prudence he cannot be said to have contributed
to his own injury: Glidden v. Reading, 38 Vt.
When a traveller receives an injury out of the travelled path, it is
not necessary to a recovery that he should have been "forced out by
unavoidable accident or circumstances beyond his control." Where he
leaves voluntarily but from a reasonable fear of injury if he remain, it
is in the eye of the law a leaving from necessity: Id.
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Beld, that under the circumstances of the case the court correctly
nstructed&the jury that "the plaintiff had a right to presume that the
road was reasonably safe in its surface, margin, and muniments :" Id.
As it did not appear that the persons riding with the plaintiff were
in his service or employment, or owed any duty to, or had any care of
him, either permanent or temporary, the defendant town had no right
to have the jury charged that the plaintiff could not recover if any
want of care or prudence on the part of these persons contributed to his
injury: Id.
Highways and Bridyes-Pleading.-Inan action to recover damages
for an injury occasioned by a defect in a highway, a declaration describing the highway and its defects in general terms, without describing
what and where the defects were, held good: Powers v. Woodstock,
38 Vt.
PRIZE.
Relative Force of Captor and Enerny.-On a question under the Act
of Congress of July, 7th 1862, which distributes prize-money according
to the fact whether the captured vessel is of equal or superior force to
the vessel or vessels making the capture, it is proper to consider as
the capturing force, not only the flag-ship, leading, actually firing and
by her fire doing the only damage-immense damage-done; but also
any other vessel which, by having diverted the fire of the vessel forced
to surrender, by an obviously great force, by its position, conduct, and
plain purpose to come at once into the engagement and to inflict perhaps
complete destruction, may have hastened the surrender: The Iron-clad
Atlanta, 3 Wall.
SLANDER.

Pleading-Evdence.-Wherethe words charged are divisible without materially changing the sense, or constitute two distinct slanders or
charges against the plaintiff, the defendant may justify one and rely on
the general issue in defence of the other: Nott and Wife v. Stoddard,
38 Vt.
In a declaration for slander the plaintiff may allege the meaning of
the defendant in the language used, and if the defendant attempt to
justify the language, he must justify it in the sense alleged: it is not
sufficient to justify the very words: Id.
Testimony of witnesses that during a certain period they heard reports
of the accusation by the defendant against the pliintiff, is admissible,
if the accusation was made before the period referred to by the witnesses, as tending to show the consequences of the defendant's wrongful
act, it being understood that the reports were that the defendant made
such accusation, not that certain persons repeated the accusation under
such circumstances as to make themselves liable: Id.
Evidence of the effect of the slander upon the plaintiff is admissible
to the extent of the direct and natural consequences of the defamatory
words spoken: Id.
C., at the instance of the plaintiff, inquired of the defendant as to the
report that he had charged the plaintiff with stealing wood, to which
the defendant replied that it was so, he saw it himself, and went on to

